English Law/Contract/Consideration

Consideration is an additional requirement in English law before a contract is enforceable. A person wishing to enforce an agreement must show that they have brought something to the bargain which has "something of value in the eyes of the law", either by conferring a benefit on another person or incurring a detriment at their request. In practice this means not simple gratitude or love, not things already done in the past, and not promising to perform a pre-existing duty unless performance takes place for a third party. Metaphorically, consideration is "the price for which the promise is bought". It is contentious in the sense that it gives rise to a level of complexity that legal systems which do not take their heritage from simply do not have. In reality the doctrine of consideration operates in a very small scope, and creates few difficulties in commercial practice. After reform in the United States, especially the §90 which allows all promises to bind if it would otherwise lead to "injustice", a report in 1937 by the Law Revision Committee, , proposed that promises in writing, for past consideration, for part payments of debt, promising to perform pre-existing obligations, promising to keep an offer open, and promises that another relies on to their detriment should all be binding. The report was never enacted in legislation, but almost all of its recommendations have been put into effect through case law since, albeit with difficulty.

When a contract is formed, good consideration is needed, and so a gratuitous promise is not binding. That said, while consideration must be of sufficient value in the law's eyes, it need not reflect an adequate price. Proverbially, one may sell a house for as little as a peppercorn, even if the seller "does not like pepper and will throw away the corn." This means the courts do not generally enquire into the fairness of the exchange, unless there is statutory regulation or (in specific contexts such as for consumers,, or ) there are two parties of. Another difficulty is that consideration for a deal was said not to exist if the thing given was an act done before the promise, such as promising to pay off a loan for money already used to educate a girl. In this situation the courts have long shown themselves willing to hold that the thing done was implicitly relying on the expectation of a reward. More significant problems arise where parties to a contract wish to vary its terms. The old rule, predating the development of the protections in the law of economic, was that if one side merely promises to perform a duty which she had already undertaken in return for a higher price, there is no contract. However, in the leading case of , the Court of Appeal held that it would be more ready to construe someone performing essentially what they were bound to do before as giving consideration for the new deal if they conferred a "practical benefit" on the other side. So, when Williams, a carpenter, was promised by Roffey Bros, the builders, more money to complete work on time, it was held that because Roffey Bros would avoid having to pay a penalty clause for late completion of its own contract, would potentially avoid the expense of litigation and had a slightly more sensible mechanism for payments, these were enough. Speaking of consideration, stated that, "courts nowadays should be more ready to find its existence... where the  and where the finding of consideration reflects the true intention of the parties." In other words, in the context of contractual variations, the definition of consideration has been watered down. However, in one situation the "practical benefit" analysis cannot be invoked, namely where the agreed variation is to reduce debt repayments. In , the House of Lords held that even though Mrs Beer promised Mr Foakes he could pay back £2090 19 by instalment and without interest, she could subsequently change her mind and demand the whole sum. Despite Lord Blackburn registering a note of dissent in that case and other doubts, the Court of Appeal held in , that it was bound by the precedent of the Lords and could not deploy the "practical benefit" reasoning of Williams for any debt repayment cases.