Iranian Nuclear Crisis Timeline/2005

The Iranian Nuclear Crisis Timeline details the events that have led to the contemporary crisis surrounding the Iranian uranium enrichment program.

August 14, 2005

 * President Ahmadinejad presents the Iranian Majles with a cabinet of 21 little known Shi'a Islamist hardliners. Hope for gradual liberal democratic reform in Iran withers.

June 25, 2005

 * Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is elected President of Iran in run-off election. Perceived as a hardliner.

May 22, 2005

 * Iranian Council of Guardians administratively winnowed the field of preesidential candidates from 1,014 to a mere 6: Rafsanjani, Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, Karrubi, Qalibaf, Moin, Ali Larijani, and Mehralizadeh.

March 2005

 * U.S. Secretary of State Condolleeza Rice announces the second Bush administration's failed policy of isolating the Iranians: "We've made very clear that we have a lot of other problems with the Iranians. We've also made very clear that we don't intend to do anything to legitimize the Iranian regime. And so what we're looking at here is helping the Europeans in their diplomacy, not shifting policy toward Iran." Glenn Kessler. "Analysis: Shift in U.S. Stance Shows Power of Seven-Letter Word." Washington Post. June 1, 2006.

May 2004

 * May 25: Habib, Ace of Spies. CIA undertakes investigation of the role played by Ahmed Chalabi and his intelligence chief, Aras Karim Habib, in convincing the U.S. to invade Iraq.  They are believed to have passed U.S. secrets to Iran, and that Mr Habib has been a paid Iranian agent for several years.  Source: Julian Borger. "US Intelligence Fears Iran Duped Hawks Into Iraq War." Guardian. May 25, 2004.
 * May 6: U.S. House of Representatives passes Resolution 398, 376 to 3, calling on the U.S. government "to use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

February 2004

 * In what would become a familair refrain in 2006, Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi states, "This industry is strictly for peaceful purposes. No one can deprive us of this natural, legal and legitimate right."  Source: Joby Warrick. "Iranian Nuclear Plans Found: U.N. Team's Discovery Raises Doubts About Tehran's Vow of Candor."  The Washington Post. February 13, 2004.
 * Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi states that, "We suspended uranium enrichment voluntarily and temporarily. Later, when our relations with the IAEA return to normal, we will definitely resume enrichment."  Source: Ali Akbar Dareini. "Iranians To Resume Enriching Uranium; Minister Dislcoses Military's Atomic Role." The Washington Post. March 11, 2004.

December 18, 2003

 * Iran signs NPT (nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) Additional Protocol on Nuclear Safeguards

November 26, 2003

 * IAEA Board votes to pass resolution censuring Iran, but stops short of recommending sanctions.

November 25, 2003

 * Britain, France and Germany reach agreement with U.S. about the text of a UN resolution warning Iran about its nuclear activities.

November 11, 2003

 * IAEA report states that Iran has admitted that it produced plutonium but adds there is no evidence that the country is trying to build an atomic bomb.

November 13, 2003

 * Washington dismisses the November 11, 2003 IAEA report as "impossible to believe". UN stands by the report.

November 10, 2003

 * Iran states it is suspending uranium enrichment and intends to allow tougher IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities.

October 23, 2003

 * Iranian Supreme National Security Council secretary Hassan Rowhani states: "We will suspend our activities for as long as we deem necessary. This could be for one day, one year or longer. The decision is ours."

June 8, 2003

 * Crackdown on pro-reform movement in Iran.

November 2000

 * Operation Merlin, a flawed CIA covert action to give flawed nuclear weapons blueprints to Iran is launched in an efort to penetrate the Iranian nuclear weapons program. Source: James Risen.  2005.  State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration.  New York: Free Press. ISBN 0743270673.  Pp. 193-218.