Talk:Confirmation bias and conflict

Comments
I address many of the same points in an essay https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Socialism/Bipartisan_fraud I've been working on for some time, though this is the first time I remember seeing this resource. Yet, the emphasis here is all wrong, if you'll forgive me for saying so. If I had seen this resource I would have said something sooner. In fact, I've even addressed many of the problems with the way this resource presents the problem. For example, language is indeed the problem, but it's not that different parties speak mutually unintelligible language. Their language is perfectly understood by each party's counterpart. The problem is that the political langue de bois is humbug altogether and difficult to use for making real critical arguments outside the media's diegesis. I'll probably end up citing this resource in my own essay and addressing the issues in a bit more detail. I hope you don't take offense, and I'm letting you know now so that you don't just assume I'm being passive aggressive if you were to run across it yourself. AP295 (discuss • contribs) 22:11, 28 September 2023 (UTC)

According to Paul Graham's hierarchy of disagreement, one should generally aim to refute the central point of something they disagree with, so I'll try do that now, or at least state a counterargument: People do not generally ignore information that is inconsistent with their prior beliefs or go out of their way to seek only information consistent with their prior beliefs. In fact, under normal circumstances they probably become more attentive. There's a good case to be made that our minds learn using something like Bayesian integration (I'll find a reference or two later). This process would not work if people were in the habit of ignoring information inconsistent with their a-priori knowledge. It's just not true to say that "Everyone prefers information and sources consistent with their preconceptions.". That's not how the mind works. The reason people behave strangely with political media is because it's manipulative hokum. It is not intended merely to indulge public demand, but to evoke a flight-or-fight response, an amygdala hijack. It is a conscious effort to defraud the public and render them politically impotent. AP295 (discuss • contribs)

I'll probably copy the above into my essay, and I hope you'll comment either here or on my essay's talk page. The central point of this resource is very likely false or at least a very misleading distortion. One cannot look at political division and say "Look at all these people who refuse to see the other side. It must be that they're all willfully ignorant." It does not follow. I feel like I really have my work cut out for me in reviewing this resource, but I'm glad I caught it because I it will help refine my own essay. AP295 (discuss • contribs)


 * Thanks for the feedback. Your comments remind me of a review I read of a biography on Kahneman and Tversky that said that Kahneman is happy when he's proven wrong, because it means that he's less wrong than he was before ;-) If my memory is correct, the reviewer said that Kahneman thinks he's always wrong, and Tversky thought he was always right. Tversky was once proven wrong ... by Kahneman ;-)
 * I agree that many people spend time listening to arguments that may contradict their preconceptions. That's not inconsistent with the claim that "everyone prefers information and sources consistent with preconceptions".
 * Before I say more, I will study your Socialism/Bipartisan fraud and comment further after I do that, but I won't give you a deadline, because I have many other commitments. Thanks for your comments. DavidMCEddy (discuss • contribs) 01:35, 29 September 2023 (UTC)


 * I appreciate it and don't mean to sound unduly critical of your resource. There's a difference though between having a preference and being incapable or unwilling to integrate any information to the contrary. While one can be in denial of something, I don't believe this is our natural tendency. Consider the example I wrote for my essay, which I've deliberately set outside the context of political media: suppose you're watching the weather station and learn that there's a raging, thousand-acre wildfire about ten miles upwind from your house. You would certainly prefer that this were not the case, but you would not have a preference or tendency to defer to your a-priori knowledge of the situation, which suggest there exists no fire at all, and then change the channel because you don't like the weatherman's tone. In other words, you'd prefer that there were no wildfire, but very much prefer to know if there is one. AP295 (discuss • contribs) 21:36, 29 September 2023 (UTC)