User:KYPark/Triangle of reference

Overview
The symbol on the left, say, the image and message of Ogden & Richards' (1923) triangle of reference, may be neither self-evident nor self-sufficient enough to "refer to" the referent on the right of itself, say, the jigsaw puzzle piece the triangle would fit into the world. Therefore, the successful disambiguation and reference must eventually be left to the thought of the adaptive, cognitive, imaginative, constructive, interpretive subject on top, hence the synonym reference, however illusory cognitive biases may underlie in context in practice.

An illusion is easily illustrated by the gray bar whose shadow remains the same in isolation but surprisingly looks like varying from context to context such as on the background brightening from the dark to light gray shadow. The known object is as context-variant as constructed by the knowing subject under illusion. Meanwhile, the known project is readily assumed to be context-invariant, which then may not exactly match with the context-variant object. This mismatch could be resolved only by the knowing subject, without which it then would be implausible to do.

The triangle with its base dotted rather looks like a biped around the head, which is thus central.

Popper (1979)

 * Revised ed. 1979.

As an extension of his belief in Cartesian dualism, Popper (1979) breaks down the world into: Yet Popper's three worlds are not mutually exclusive but inclusive more or less than not. The Cartesian ego or subject as cogito ("I think") looks like a radical or unreal solipsist as if it should cause or be caused by nothing. Indeed, we see or think only to relate ourselves to something in context, in concert with many other things. Or, we see or think only to make a mess of things, as may be suggested by the box at the bottom of this page.

In a way, projects or products supervene or depend on both physical objects and metaphysical subjects or concepts, while subjects do on objects. In another, subjects are constantly interacting with -- conditioning and conditioned by -- projects and objects as the two feet of the bipedal triangle of reference[w] (Ogden & Richards 1923), or as "the human condition" (Magritte 1933). At last, Popper took the subjective "interaction" seriously, as suggested by.

Toward an information model




The Moebius ring, as on the right, is so twisted that the inner, concave surface gives way to the outer, convex surface. As such, it would be worth an illustrasion of dialogues and the like of taking turns.

Suppose that the speaker moves along the inner circle while viewing and encoding a case, and the hearer in turn along the outer while reviewing and (finishing) decoding it, hence the four-stroke dialogical cycle.

By the way, this may be compared to the four-stroke engine cycle, including inhale, compression (cold strokes), expansion, and exhale (hot strokes). Nonetheless, the case either in mind or out there is not so definite as the fuel and air inhaled in the engine. To be sure, the code could not precisely fit the case as roughly viewed and encoded, whether in mind (as signified of de Saussure 1916) or in reality (as referent of Ogden and Richards 1923).

Since Ogden and Richards (1923) took this mismatch between the code and the case most seriously, many sympathetic dictums have been put forward, say:


 * "This is not a pipe." (But the image thereof) (Magritte 1929)
 * "The map is not the territory." (Korzybski 1933)
 * "The description is not the described." (Krishnamurti c. 1975)

In a way, we carry on dialogues in dialect or jargon so that some compromising dialectic or negotiation is needed between speaker and hearer, in terms of view and review of the case, as well as encoding and decoding therefor.

While explicitly reviewing the speaker's case and code critically, the hearer may also implicitly view the case, as if in her own initiative. In response to the hearer's response, on the other hand, the speaker may also review the case she viewed or adopted and the code she adapted thereto.

Accordingly, the processes of both parties appear as analogous or parallel to each other as both sides of the Moebius ring, perhaps cooperating as noted by Grice (1975) in "Logic and Conversation" in relation to his hypothetical  implicature or simply implication.

What is connoted is what is implied. The real meaning of metaphors is hidden in such a way explicit as connoted than denoted, and implicit as implicated than explicated!