User:Kaihsu/DraftC

Legislation and statutory interpretation.

Module C: Statutory interpretation.

Literal rule
“The only rule for construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intent of the Parliament which passed the Act. If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in that natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such a case, best declare the intention of the lawgiver”: Sussex Peerage (1844) 11 Cl&Fin 85.

It is presumed that the words selected and used, in a particular context in legislation, declare the true intention of the legislature in an accurate and unambiguous manner; so where the words are clear and explicit, the court should always give effect to them regardless of the consequences: Jervis CJ in Abley v Dale (1850) 20 LJCP 33. This is the default; case reach the courts when this does not work: Lord Bingham in R (Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] UKHL 13. (DraftC2)

Golden rule
But where two interpretations are equally possible then the courts will advert to an interpretation which appeals more to common sense and do more justice, instead of the one where the application of the plain meaning rule would yield absurdity in the context of the legislation when read as a whole: e.g. City of Victoria v Bishop of Vancouver Island [1921] AC 384; ‘in the vicinity of’ was interpreted to cover a person already on the premises in Adler v George (1964).

Mischief rule
For the true interpretation of a statute, four things must be considered:
 * 1) What was the common law before the making of the Act.
 * 2) What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide.
 * 3) What remedy Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth.
 * 4) The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of the judges is to construe so as to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy: Heydon’s Case (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a.

For example, “soliciting in a street” in the Street Offenses Act 1959 was interpreted to include tapping on the window to attract the attention of passers-by: Smith v Hughes (1960). (DraftC3)

Purposive approach
Courts could now:
 * resort to the purposive approach to interpret legislation when the traditional methods of statutory construction were in doubt or when they resulted in an absurdity
 * use extraneous material such as ministerial statements to elucidate the background of the legislation: Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart per Lord Browne-Wilkinson.

But this cannot be contra legem: Oliver LJ in Wicks v Firth [1983] 2 AC 214. “The court’s task, within the permissible bounds of interpretation, is to give effect to Parliament’s purpose”; provisions should be read in the context of the statute as a whole, and the statute as a whole should be read in the historical context: Lord Bingham in R (Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] UKHL 13. (DraftC4)