User talk:Jayjitsu

 Hello Jayjitsu, and welcome to Wikiversity! If you need help, feel free to visit my talk page, or contact us and ask questions. After you leave a comment on a talk page, remember to sign and date; it helps everyone follow the threads of the discussion. The signature icon in the edit window makes it simple. To get started, you may


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And don't forget to explore Wikiversity with the links to your left. Be bold to contribute and to experiment with the sandbox or your userpage, and see you around Wikiversity! --Mu301Bot 16:52, 5 September 2009 (UTC) mikeu 16:52, 5 September 2009 (UTC)

M-ICE and BANG
M-ICE & BANG look like interesting ideas. Do you need collaborators? I'm waiting for when you create a userpage! --CQ 21:29, 5 September 2009 (UTC)
 * Thanks for including the fantastic userpage! --CQ 16:59, 7 September 2009 (UTC)

Copyright problem with Image:Ice court.jpg
All of the original artwork was my own so nothing to reference, although they will all be removed as new projects unfolding in 2014

Image uploads
Please note that whenever you upload an image, you must provide details of its source and licensing status. The majority of images have to be available under an accepted free licence in order to be used on Wikiversity, only in very limited circumstances can unfree images be used. It may be helpful to read Uploading files. Your uploaded files are listed below. For each, please add details of their source and licensing information, otherwise they will have to be deleted. Regards. Adambro 11:28, 8 September 2009 (UTC)


 * 11:59, 8 September 2009 Jayjitsu (Talk | contribs | block) uploaded "File:Paltalk.JPG" ‎ (paltalk)
 * 10:09, 8 September 2009 Jayjitsu (Talk | contribs | block) uploaded "File:ESA.jpg" ‎ (ESA)
 * 09:30, 8 September 2009 Jayjitsu (Talk | contribs | block) uploaded "File:Orange ESAI.jpg" ‎ (ESAI main logo)
 * 19:37, 7 September 2009 Jayjitsu (Talk | contribs | block) uploaded "File:Ice court.jpg" ‎ (court)
 * 19:15, 7 September 2009 Jayjitsu (Talk | contribs | block) uploaded "File:Mice.jpg" ‎ (mice)
 * 18:47, 7 September 2009 Jayjitsu (Talk | contribs | block) uploaded "File:Bluefg.jpg" ‎ (ESAI logo)
 * 18:42, 7 September 2009 Jayjitsu (Talk | contribs | block) uploaded "File:Esailog.jpg" ‎ (ESAI logo)
 * 18:37, 7 September 2009 Jayjitsu (Talk | contribs | block) uploaded "File:Gap1.jpg" ‎ (gap 1)
 * 18:36, 7 September 2009 Jayjitsu (Talk | contribs | block) uploaded "File:Gap2.jpg" ‎ (gap 2)
 * 18:26, 7 September 2009 Jayjitsu (Talk | contribs | block) uploaded "File:Sinmik.jpg" ‎ (ESAI logo)
 * 18:23, 7 September 2009 Jayjitsu (Talk | contribs | block) uploaded "File:Globcalpagepic.gif" ‎ (Globcal icon)
 * 18:20, 7 September 2009 Jayjitsu (Talk | contribs | block) uploaded "File:Amb jay.jpg" ‎ (My pic)
 * 18:19, 7 September 2009 Jayjitsu (Talk | contribs | block) uploaded "File:S-y-bluefg.jpg" ‎ (G.E.A.P ICON)
 * 18:13, 7 September 2009 Jayjitsu (Talk | contribs | block) uploaded "File:Peugeot-rcz-300x225.jpg" ‎

Collaboration
New developments 2014, old stuff will be deletedRequest custodian action and we'll take a look. --mikeu talk 13:25, 10 September 2009 (UTC)

List of your pages
Q : Where can I see a list of all of my pages ?


 * One way is to click on the my contributions tab (after you have logged in) at the top of every page. This will show a list of all the pages that you have recently edited.  Another is to use Categories.  You could add something like    to the bottom of all related pages. For example, I have added PCM to Category:Pollution.  But you could create a new category for pages that are part of a larger project, for example   .  While we are on the topic...  You might want to take a look at Naming conventions. I have moved the "PCM" page to the more descriptive title Pollution Control and Monitoring but I have left PCM as a redirect to prevent external links from breaking. --mikeu talk 15:51, 9 September 2009 (UTC)

image info
Hi, I noticed that you have included the image summary and license info in the page Blackbelt. Usually that information is added to the image file itself (File:GREEN.JPG for example) since the image might be used in multiple pages and this allows for keeping the info centralized. --mikeu talk 23:35, 20 September 2009 (UTC)

Introduction

This chapter examines the literature in health and safety management, safety culture, competency development and behaviour, with especial regard to the development of a competency assurance program. The literature review evaluates underlying concepts of safety management looking at management systems, legal structures and how they influence organisational change and safety management behaviour. The literature review presents an overview of the issues involved in competency assurance from an applied research perspective. The review provides a critical review and synthesis of an existing body of safety literature. The literature review is divided into five topics. Together they contribute to a holistic approach for measuring group competency and offers a robust academic structure for answering the research question. Failures of an oil and gas industry

In 1988 the oil and gas industry’s health and safety management came under scrutiny after the Piper Alpha oil rig exploded in the North Sea resulting in the loss of 167 lives. The cause was poor safety training, inadequate application of managerial controls and a range of behavioral human factors (Shallcross, 2013: Cohen and Colligan, 1998). The official investigation surfaced as the Cullen Report which prompted a surge in health and safety legislation; followed by major reforms in safety management through development of company specific safety training programs (Cullen, 1990). Additional emphasis was given to regular writing and reviewing of procedures designed around legal enforcement. The employment growth in safety managers, site safety advisors and safety officers was apparent as was a significant growth in safety related training. These changes are believed to have been responsible for a 25% reduction in injury rates in the offshore oil industry (Cohen & Colligan, 1998).

Figure 1: Worldwide oil & gas industry, fatality and incidents statistics. OGP (2010)

Figure 1 shows the years following Piper Alpha [1988] as showing a significant decrease in fatalities and major incidents. This was believed to be directly attributed to Lord Cullen’s 106 recommendations which included management regulations. One monumental outcome of the investigation was known as the Safety Case. This was an act of law which was enforced in 1992 requiring that all major oi and gas operators identify their hazards and risks and show by evidence that they are capable of managing them by implementing the required controls (Binder, et al. 2010: Cullen, 1990). Unfortunately the underlying behavioural issues were never really addressed. Recognising that human factors were pointed out as a major contributor to the disaster in the Cullen report. (Cullen, 1990). Some years later Lord Cullen claims that ‘as a young judge the inquiry was very difficult because no-one really knew anything about the behaviours of oil and gas workers working in remote locations’. Indicating a major failing in the enquiry. Evidence that was supported by another civil action in 1997 which focused on two of the deceased workers, finding them to be negligent by not following procedures and taking short cuts (Keane, 2013). One particular study [OTI 95 633, HSE.gov.uk] shows that evidence during the enquiry was predominantly focused on quantitative engineering issues which clearly overlooks behavioural aspects. Despite mentioning in the Cullen Reports that the new attitude to ‘safety philosophies’ in the offshore oil industry requires an increased emphasis on behavior.

The piece of legislation titled the Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations (2005) had the biggest impact post Piper Alpha. The legislation required that oil rig operators prove with evidence that they are in full control of their operations and in compliance all legal regulations. (Binder, et al. 2010). The Safety Case was basically the framework by which operators could identify hazards (things that cause harm) and show how they intend to reduce risks (the likelihood and severity associated with the hazard). This brought into play a term derived from UK health and safety law called ALARP or ‘as low as reasonably practicable’. This term was originally enshrined in the case of Edwards versus the National Coal Board in 1949, which looked at how risk based decisions should be reasonable by also considering cost, time and trouble. This was an attempt to offer a common sense approach and unless there was a gross disproportion between the cost and benefits, then decisions taken were agreed as acceptable (Binder et al, 2010). An attempt to consider the skills and competencies required to bring about control. With Piper Alpha in mind, the term ‘negligence’ also suggested a failure to take proper care but interestingly there was no mention of the knowledge, capabilities or behaviours to do that. These all being the main attributes of competency. Pointing to the failures of the enquiry with possible over reliance on legislation as the only mind-set to bring about change. Cohen & Colligan (1998) remind us that it improvements were attributed mainly to the 106 management regulations implemented by Cullen had a significant impact. The problems, area of behavior still remains (Allin & Craig, 2010).

The Deepwater Horizon oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico 2010 discharged 4.9 million barrels of crude into the local environment (Allin & Craig, 2010). The spot light now on the effectiveness of previous safety training and employment of safety advisors which is again raises the issues over the effectiveness of safety training. This catastrophe pointing to an obvious failure in the application and implementation of safety regulations and company specific training which has had limited impact on safe working behaviors. With these catastrophes in mind, critiques of Safety Management argue that training is not the only problem as they turn towards understanding the principles of Safety Culture for answers (Stuart, A. 2013). The reasoning is that Safety Culture is measurable though the behaviors and actions of individuals and so the effect of training can be considered (Cohen, 2010). According to Kirkpatrick (1967) one problem with training is that it relies on rote learning, often assessed through recall of memorized information. This statement does not appear to correlate well with the development of longer term behaviors that influence safety culture. Like piper Alpha the root cause of Horizons problems were also behavioural with cost cutting, a lack of safety systems and an absent industry reform, in both industry practice and government policy. Safety Management and Safety Management Systems are obviously not enough on their own.

Underlying assumptions show that although training does develop relevant knowledge thorough understanding does not take place until there is a certain amount of experiential learning including immersion as practical application that develops specific soft skills i.e. competencies that should then be measured by observing changes in behaviour. Professional capabilities are then attributed to the Kolb learning cycle, or process of reinforcement through repetitive learning (Muscat, et al. 2012). In contrast Dukker, Nyce & Dekker (2013) argue that Safety Culture cannot be reduced to an individual or a social setting but is formed through collaborative interests and through complex human interactions. A culture is formed by the group and a safety culture is formed by the efforts of individuals coming together to create an environment that limits hazards.

Safety culture is influenced by a variety of factors including by the environmental, financial and equipment usability and technology limitations. They all affect how training translates from theory into practice and this helps to explain how knowledge is converted into competency and skills. Whether competency development is more effective than training at changing behavior is the thesis question and the deliverable is to see if this can measurably influence safety culture for those involved in working in hazardous environments or remote locations.

GOALS Health and Safety Management

Under Health & Safety Law everyone has the right to work, learn and live in a safe environment (Mendeloff, Ko, Gray, 2005). Health & Safety is also the responsibility of every person, irrespective of their status or occupation (Sholz and Gray, 1990). Safety management covers a broad spectrum of responsibilities and obligations and the idea is to create a culture of safety and a climate of responsibility and accountability in any organisation that adopts these principles. Meneldoff, Koy and Gray (2005) assert that the ‘goal orientation’ (Gardener, 2005, p. 345) of health and safety is that everyone in an organization develops the required knowledge, of workplace hazards. The literature agrees that the process of management is to encourage individual responsibilities and that so that accountability can be implemented (Sammer, 2011,Gardner, 2005, Cohen, 2010)). The approach is to also use in-house standards as these inform policy decisions and they are implemented using procedures and processes which not only establish rules but also beliefs that drive behaviours. Behaviours intended to reduce known risks to a level that is as low as reasonably practical [ALARP] (Cohen, 2010, Mendeloff, Ko, Gray, 2005).

Safety Management is more than just policy, procedures and processes as it also relates to the physical and mental well-being of employees within a workplace. The missing element is how these safety systems influence wellbeing and behaviour and the same of vice-versa. The work of (Sammer, 2011, Sholz & Gray, 1990) recognise that safe conditions is a bi-product of management practice that influences the behaviours of those involved in implementing and overseeing mechanisms to reduce risk. Unfortunately managerial risks take a broader organizational perspective that includes client, employees, equipment, and reputation and also in most cases the natural environment. Whereas an individual might look at risk from a perspective solely of his own duties and responsibilities and seek the easy option and this means that that risks and perceptions can be very subjective (Martin and Liao, 1990). Sholz & Gray (1990) also recognise that acceptance of risk in industry is much lower in comparison to earlier periods. Believed to be through the impact of a new legislation but also what is less understood is how this could have been because of changes in perception potentially because of changes in technology (Martin and Liao, 2013). Crossley, Ashby & Todd (2013) recognise that health and safety strategies are also driven by legislation, but the stress the importance of finance. Financial instruments such as fines for non-compliance and profits from compliance is what drives organizational behaviour. Assessing risk within these constraints is much more about business continuity and profit (Crossley, Ashby & Todd, 2013). A risk assessment therefore needs to identify hazards by calculating risks to both individual and to the organisation. Health and Safety Management seeks to create a a safe organisation and a safe workforce, by collaboration (Lorinkova et al, 2013).. Crossley, Ashby, & Todd (2013) look at this in a qualitative and quantitative, by looking at how risk has a measurable factors of cause and effect but highly influenced by perception. Risk assessment mechanisms therefore become more complex because of the need to oscillate between the two concepts of objectivity and subjectivity which requires analytical skills. Analysis for the gaol of managing risk is also a dynamic process (Cohen, 2010). Safety Management as the years have moved on appears more behavioural or less about abiding by rules and more about having the skills and the abilities to assure levels of compliance (Lorinkova et al, 2013)... Safety management is about managing risk. Risk that is often dynamic in nature, and the same applies to the changing state of the environment or workplace as well as the changing state of the organisation. Developing a framework that considers the dynamics of change and the systems and sub-systems for managing compliance and individual responsibility are therefore matched. Benati and Gellar (2005) within their research they talk of leadership but as an individual quality, this is also the case with (Lorinkova et al, 2013). In this sense they depart from the usual bottom line that safety is only about compliance in relation to profits and unknowingly surface a transformative concept that leadership may be less about individuals and more about the sum total of the goals of a community impacted by a system. As a result they help to establish that leadership is not just about management interaction (Benatti & Gellar, 2005). Increasingly, leadership in health and safety is about ‘improving team performance’ and this involves changing both individuals and groups behaviours (Lorinkova et al, 2013, Cohen, 2010). Another type of leadership is one that foster the qualities of individuals to allow them to optimize their performance. Health and safety is increasingly viewed not as managing people and enforcing regulations but providing leadership in the health and safety area (Cohen & Collington, 1998).

Organisational Safety Management

Under Health & Safety Law, every workplace should be a space where every potential hazard and danger is identified and risks minimised. A safe environment then relates to the goals of safety managers and systems; designed around legislation to protect employees whilst making the environment a safe place to be (Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974). A workplace environment covers a wide range of hazardous activities requiring sufficient supervision over physical activities, using managerial frameworks to coordinate the ongoing development of a safe place to be i.e. a safety culture (Jonson, 2006). A culture developed around corporate goals that includes developing skills and experiences through training and education that improve performance, responds to legislation and helps profitability. Employee responsibilities need to respond to business dynamics and evolving roles and responsibilities that are designed around a corporate model that encapsulates the organisation goals (Johnson, 2006).

Accountability is essential in health and safety and is stressed by the legislation ((Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974). Employee accountability is a balance between legal and professional requirements. Generally underwritten by a contract as a form of agreement, suggesting that knowledge and experience is put to good use whilst working on criteria that help define the demands of a job and is aligned with the organisations’ corporate responsibility (Biglake and Roach, 2006). Knowledge and experience that is often learned through repetition and cyclic exposure of a variety of risk levels through which learning takes place (Kolb, 1984). The emphasis on having practical skills in the workforce sense is not only an individual partaking but also requires transfer of knowledge and skills within the workforce community. Real time challenges require a group mind to solve problems, and so the goal of many organisations is to develop collaborative problem solving skills. This creates opportunities to develop critical thinking within the safety of a group (Pellegrino, 2013) thorough which a thorough understanding of hazards and risks can develop. Over time this develops comprehension and confidence to make informed decisions, but this can be easily blurred when the goals of an individual are different from the group (Johnson, 2006).

Aligning Corporate Goals

The goal of health and safety management is to mitigate risks and therefore there must be the right knowledge in place, skills to act out that knowledge and the right attitude to make sure efforts are of an appropriate standard (Dworkin and Posthuma, 1997). These being the attribute of competency. A company’s assets being more than just physical equipment and finances as it also relates to human capital i.e. the competencies and abilities of the workforce (Dworkin and Posthuman, 1997). The problem being that as organisations change, technology changes, employees leave, and the skill base fluctuates, making delivery of goals a dynamic process. The goals of management should therefore be to develop systems capable of responding to change. One obvious goal would be an incident free workplace (Binder et al, 2010) although this requires an alignment of objectives and targets that conform to legislation via procedural rules but also through aligning behaviours with the level of skills through which an assurance can be guaranteed. The term good practice is often used and this is synonymous with accountability (Dworkin and Posthuma, 1997). At an organizational level evidence of accountability is often measured through continual improvement and best practice is the indication of expertise within a defined area (Dworkin and Posthuma, 1997. Subject Matter Expertise tend to arise out of practical problem solving, but this in itself may require rule breaking, as creative problem solving does not always conform to a regime (Prior et al, 2011). Expertise as a value of leadership is also not standardized as individual qualities differ from person to person making them unique (Binder et al., 2010). The ability to respond to change is possibly the goal in which a management systems effectiveness could be measured.

Continual Improvement

Health & Safety management is a cyclic process of learning through continual improvement. Systems therefore rely on information in order to continually be updated to meet the needs of the organisation and the workforce (Shallcross, 2013). Key drivers such as the need to encourage everyone to understand the importance of responsibility and accountability requires a mechanism of competency development and assurance to make sure it happens. Employees are then led to believe that safety is the ‘team’s responsibility’ (Lorinkova et al, 2013), and not just a managerial goal. A framework through which changing organisational demands can be measured, needs to therefore consider how change impacts on behaviour. Shallcross (2013) reminds us that a managerial agenda may be a barrier to change as continual improvement requires constant evaluation and a new ‘knowledge base’ (Lanellie & Martel, 2104, p 50). This is generally in favour of the company rather than the workforce. Cohen & Collington (1998) recognise that change in favour of the company can create conflict and so it is important to recognise how the goals of the company can be aligned with the behavioural goals of the workforce, and competency assurance could be a mechanism that allow successful change management in an organisation.

Developing a safety culture

A robust Health & Safety management system requires training and an integrated approach in which competencies are developed in line with organisational goals (Health and Safety, 1974). Competencies through skills and experience underpin safety culture (Jonson, 2006) and unlike training competency development is more dynamic and cyclic as continual improvement relies on the acceptance of an ever changing environment (Jonson, 2006). Safety management and competency need to be continually updated to respond to this constant change through the workplace and workforce behaviours can merge. Changing circumstances also suggests that procedures should regularly change, but this is far from practical, therefore competency assurance must be a combination of pro-Active flexibility and to a lesser extent reactive thinking based on static rules. Reactive thinking examples would include corrective decision-making such as dealing with control failures. The danger being that there may be over reliance on procedural systems which in turn develops the hierarchy of command and control (Jonson, 2006). Procedures themselves are also static although legal clauses could allow for more creative behaviours providing they apply the dynamics of change to the decision-making philosophies that reduce risks to ALARP (Dworkin & Posthuma, 1997).

Summary

This section of literature mainly considers how organisational goals differs from the accepted responsibilities of the workforce (Cohen & Collington, 1992, Johnson, 2006, Lorinkova et al, 2013). The increasing complexity of many organisations means the achieving health and safety goals is often difficult. Competency programs are one possible solution to achieving health and safety goals in the modern workplace. Using competency assurance as an integrative mechanism that with different aspects of safety issues including culture that should capture the working environment. The flexibility of competency assurance offers some room for further exploration although there should be an element of caution as too much flexibility will be in contrast to the more rigid rules defined by policy and procedures. Management goals are related to constantly changing levels of complexity, and this in itself poses a problem from which a competency assurance framework is difficult to define. The often vague expectations of managers, whose goals often differ from the values and beliefs held by employees (Epstein, 2002) could be brought into alignment through more adaptive systems. The more standard versions of safety compliance such as policy, procedures and training could be further developed by integrating them more effectively around the goals of a competency assurance program, offering channels for further investigation. A vehicle for Motivation – Near miss reporting

A near miss is an incident that does not result in injury or damage. Near miss reporting can take many forms, increasingly technology is enabling individuals to report and log near misses and this allow near miss reporting to be conducted in a more systematic way. Every near miss reporting system must not be punitive (National Safety Council, 2012). Near miss reporting offers management crucial data that can allow management to understand risks and to construct systems and frameworks that prevent accidents or other ‘loss producing events’ (National Safety Council, 2012, p. 1) The data provided by near miss reporting will give management data ‘for statistical analysis, correlational studies and trending’ (National Safety Council, 2012, p. 2), to create system and provide will improve health and safety. Near miss- analysis ‘can help companies achieve the ideal of zero- incidents’ (National Safety Council, 2012, p. 3). A workplace should have a system for providing feedback and near miss reporting is an excellent mechanisms for developing skills (Makin and Winder, 2008). That is because there are opportunities to raise awareness of issues, obstacles and conflicts, and then address them through analysis and investigation, towards a conclusion and evaluative steps that lead to corrective actions. A common ground on which to base shared values and beliefs is through competency development and knowledge and education (Johnson, 2006). This could include development of a training programme that together is paramount as it brings the workforce together, and acknowledges the cultural differences and possibly misplaced beliefs especially when faced with changing workplace hazards and the requirement for accurate recognition through reporting and the reporting of potential near miss incidents (Cate, 2007).